Introduction
The United States Army is entering an interwar period, forcing an answer to hard questions regarding identity and force structure to face future threats. Unified Land Operations builds upon previous U.S. Army doctrines of AirLand battle and full spectrum operations. 1 Essentially the army's mantra is to fight anytime anywhere against a near peer threat capable of conducting major combat operations while simultaneously retaining the agility to combat another threat, which may be asymmetrical. Arguably, the tenets of Unified Land Operations (ULO) existed in the British army from 1914 through 1921 as they conducted major combat operations in Europe against Germany in-conjunction with a counterinsurgency in Ireland. This essay examines the British army through the lens of Unified Land Operations by briefly describing the foundation of current Army doctrine, setting the context of the situation through historical analysis of the key players, developing a case study of the period in question and concluding with the implications for U.S. Army doctrine.
The new doctrine is "an intellectual outgrowth of both previous operations doctrine, and recent combat experience."
2 Familiar terms such as offensive, defensive, and stability operations appear as well as defense support of civil authorities. The doctrine places increased emphasis on cooperation with interagency and multinational partners as part of the team necessary to defeat current and future adversaries. Unified Land Operations (ULO) relies on collective and individual initiative to gain and maintain the initiative against the threat. Initiative as described in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 allows Army forces to strike the enemy, with both lethal and non-lethal measures, in time, place, or manner for which the enemy is not prepared.
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The Army describes the methodology of conducting land operations as Decisive Action.
Each operational environment is different, and thus requires a mix of offensive, defensive, stability operations, or defense support of civil authorities. The purpose of offensive operations is the defeat the enemy threat, seize key terrain, resources, or population centers. Defensive operations focus on defeat of an enemy attack in order for offensive operations to regain the initiative. Stability Operations are more nebulous in the sense they focus on maintaining a safe and secure environment to provide essential governmental services or other infrastructure related services. Defense support to civilian authorities in U.S. doctrine is directed towards homeland specific tasks to establish civil security or control in support of governance. Each element of
Decisive Action requires a mix of the two Army core competencies.
The Army core competencies are Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS). CAM is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat the threat by way of seizing the advantage either physically or psychologically. 4 WAS employs the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities. The intent behind WAS is to deny the enemy the advantage while retaining the initiative. Tactical units perform one or the other in contrast to operations or campaigns in which organizations are conducting both competencies simultaneously to achieve strategic ends.
Units implement the six tenets of Unified Land Operations when conducting operations and campaigns. This essay will highlight the employment of these tenets: flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. 5 Flexibility provides the commander the ability to employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment to accomplish the mission. Integration is demonstrated by collaborating and conducting operations with other armed forces, multi-national, or interagency elements. Lethality allows commanders to retain the necessary combat power in order to create an unmatched ability to defeat the threat in a range of conditions. Adaptability can be defined by the ability to continue to assess and to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Depth enables the commander to extend operations in space, time, or purpose thus creating a challenge to the enemy throughout the strategic environment in physical, temporal, and organizational spheres. One of the key enabling tenets that allow commanders critical capability within strategic and operational environments is that of synchronization.
Regardless of which core competencies are employed, each of the six tenets remains relevant during the development of operational plans.
The core competencies highlight the need of a balanced force capable to meet a threat in major battle, but also defeat an enemy fighting a protracted conflict. This concept reflects a shift in the Army doctrine that once focused on fighting against major land threats such as the Soviet Union and Korea, but also addresses the emerging threat of non-state actors such as Al Qaeda.
The balanced concept is not new; in fact, the British Army historically maintained a balanced force to combat major threats while retaining the ability to conduct constabulary functions in their territories. The greatest challenge to British doctrine came early in the twentieth century, and serves as an excellent vignette to examine the new U.S. Army doctrine. Poe II, "British Army Reforms 1902 -1914 ," Military Affairs 31, no. 3 (1967 Poe II, "British Army Reforms 1902 -1914 18 MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race, 319. 19 Coogan, 1916: The Easter Rising, 7; Jeremy Smith, "Bluff, Bluster and Brinkmanship: Andrew Bonar Law and the Third Home Rule Bill," The Historical Journal 36, no. 1 (1993): 164. 20 J.H. Campbell, A Guide to the Home Rule Bill (The National Unionist Association, 1920), iii-x; Dockrill and French, Strategy and Intelligence, 20; Brock Millman, "British Home Defence Planning and The first major bloodletting in World War I for the British was at Ypres (OctoberNovember 1914) . 21 The tragic loss of life bled the resident knowledge and experience from the Boer Wars within the army. 22 The Ypres crisis led to changes within the force in tactics, structure, and organization. 23 While the British adjusted to the threat in France, they also maintained a defense force within the British Isles to protect the Islands while supporting civil defense authorities against growing discontent from several parties. Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919 -1921 British Army in the 19 th century and how it was influenced through wars both large and small. the majority of the forces and relying on local militias led by a small regular army contingent backed by the Royal Navy. This concept did not gain any ground with the politicians based on the experience with the American War of Independence, and other skirmishes in British territories.
The global presence would lead one to believe it was part of an international strategy; however, force arrangements were unorganized and responsive only to economic interests in colonial areas. 33 Varying purposes behind troop employment were not the only irregularities that existed prior to the Cardwell reforms of 1871. Separate cabinets within the government were responsible for different components of the Army without an established hierarchy to focus, or conjoin their efforts. The thought of passing responsibility to one single entity, such as the Secretary of War, was discarded out of fear that one person would become more powerful than the Commander in
Chief.
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The Cardwell reforms marked a significant transition in the British Military. Abolishment of the purchase system, where by acquiring a commission was through procurement, and with it, commands in the military, was one of the first reforms. Another element of the reform was the localization Act of 1872 that established sixty-six territorial districts. Those districts housed and based two line and two militia battalions, both with exclusive recruiting rights within that district.
The concept would allow one battalion to deploy while the second remained at home to train and supply drafts for the sister battalion abroad. The idea was sound as long as the number of deployed units equally matched those at home. However, constant small colonial wars in the 1870s employed eighty-two battalions overseas with only fifty-nine in Great Britain. 35 The impacts of persistent conflict stretched the army so thin that units at home station were reduced to 33 French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688 Ibid., 140. Staff, traditionally filled with kinfolk and friends, limited the promotion of those officers proven in action more capable of command. 38 Reform to the staff in brigades and regiments was also necessary. The committee identified the need for an Imperial Staff and specified the types of personnel and qualifications to assist the commander. The addition of a functional staff improved organization and planning. Once the reorganization towards a functioning administration and the 36 French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688 Ibid., 141
38 Poe II, "British Army Reforms 1902 -1914 thoughtful changes to the General staff positions was near complete, the shift of focus was towards the purpose and function of the army.
39
Observations from the Boer War led the commission to the conclusion the army did not have the capability to deploy, fight, and win. 40 The plan, therefore, was to identify the type and level of unit upon which the army's organization rested, and develop it into a capable force. The regiment became the focus of British unit reforms, closing bases and forts cut costs, which in turn provided animals and guns to the field force. 49 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919 Independence, -1921 The concept behind the Home Rule bill was to allow Ireland to self-govern while retaining ties to England. Contributing to the tension within the U.K. was the continued success of the German submarine campaign, which destroyed 300,000 to 350,000 tons of critical supplies a month in the winter of 1916-1917 and up to 860,000 in April of 1917. 69 The home defense force was required to respond to both civil disturbances and a German invasion.
United Kingdom forces conducted both Wide Area Security within the U.K. and
Combined Arms Warfare in Europe in1918 as earlier defined from ADP 3-0. Civil unrest overshadowed the threat of a German invasion and forced British leaders to retain four cavalry divisions within the interior of England. 70 The force was employed in the role of wide area security within the U.K., but retained the capability to conduct combined arms maneuver in order to defeat an invasion force or a conventional threat.
Supporting the wide area security mission in the United Kingdom were local security officials. Police chief constables were responsible for maintaining information files to provide to 67 Millman, "British Home Defence Planning and Civil Dissent": 205. 68 Ibid., 220. 69 Holmes, The Western Front, 144. 70 Millman, "British Home Defence Planning and Civil Dissent": 223.
army equivalent officers in the event of social revolution. The result were 'black lists' maintained by the police to support raids by the military. 71 The connection between local security agencies and military organizations ties back to the Cardwell reforms, and the creation of regional units within the U.K. Volunteers) created a committee to organize for the resistance and a legitimate government in order to represent the Irish republic in the international community. Their force also required arms and ammunition to fight against the U.K. constabulary forces that were conducting area security as part of defense of the realm in Ireland and Great Britain. 73 The rebels additionally 71 Millman, "British Home Defence Planning and Civil Dissent": 230.
72 Dockrill and French, Strategy and Intelligence, 140. 73 Coogan, 1916: The Easter Rising, 85. required an international ally to recognize their legitimacy and provide support through mediation at the negotiating table when hostilities ceased.
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The nationalists disagreed on some topics, but rallied their separate organizations under the cause of a free and independent Irish Republic. Their disagreement would resurface at the conclusion of the war for independence, but for the immediate future they mobilized their efforts in strategy and tactics to achieve their goals. Many of the leaders published in local papers or distributed pamphlets to educate the population in order to bring attention to their cause. They commissioned overseas envoys to garner political, financial, and material support for their cause.
Some went to America; the most memorable was the agreement with Germany considering the circumstances after 1914.
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The Citizen Army led by James Connolly was one of these organizations. Though several Irish leaders were academics and poets, James was once a soldier in the British army and a student of warfare. Specifically, he studied popular uprisings by other nations and then published the lessons learned from those events in the Workers Republic (29 May-24 July 1915). 76 The intention of the articles was to inform his fellow compatriots on how to conduct a successful revolution in order to establish their own republic.
77
The Irish Republican Brotherhood set the stage for the Easter Rising by arranging for arms, personnel, and developing a plan to seize key terrain. The organization coordinated in secret with Germany to maximize the impact on United Kingdom forces. Sir Roger Caesment and Joseph Plunkett negotiated to receive 20,000 rifles, one million rounds of ammunition, and ten machine guns. The shipment would arrive just before Easter by way of a Norwegian ship to 74 Collins, The Path to Freedom, 37-38. 75 Coogan, 1916: The Easter Rising, 84-88. 76 McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919 Independence, -1921 77 Ibid., 12. reduce the chance of a British intercept. The Germans also sought to coordinate the Irish attack with a major operation of their own to create an impact on the British leadership. Sir Roger Casement attempted to secure a battalion or at least advisors for the poorly trained Irish forces, but this arrangement never materialized. He, in fact, boarded a German submarine to pass the message to the Irish volunteer leaders explaining the arms on the ship Aud was all the Germans were willing to provide at the time. Caesment was arrested the day he landed in Ireland and unable to pass along the key information to the IRB.
81
James Connolly and Patrick Pearse arranged multiple actions in time and space to create the opportunity to achieve the desired outcome. Irish leaders developed a plan to seize key terrain while not directly engaging in combat with the United Kingdom constabulary forces. Surprise was essential to success, since the rebels lacked parity in arms and munitions with the police and constabulary forces. The Easter holiday served as the best opportunity to catch the U.K. forces off 78 Coogan, 1916: The Easter Rising, 84-87. 79 Ibid., 77.
80 Townshend, Easter 1916, 103. 81 Ibid., [130] [131] guard since they traditionally operated at minimal staffing in observance of the event.
Additionally, the Irish could execute rehearsals on Easter Sunday as part of a traditional show of force while building up combat power within the city of Dublin. The arms shipment from the Aud would arrive just days before in order to reduce the chance for the U.K. forces to conduct raids on houses and compromise the operation.
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The Aud never made it to shore, leaving the Irish leaders with a decision to abort the Confusion, lack of arms, and delay of reinforcements provided the opportunity for the British to take the initiative from the Irish. 82 McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919 Independence, -1921 83 Townshend, Easter 1916, 136-137. 84 Coogan, 1916: The Easter Rising, 105-106 .
British Counterattack to Defeat Irish Republican Army
The 86 Townshend, Easter 1916, 192. 87 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 artillery bombardments within their cellars. 88 Local sentiment initially supported the quelling of the rebel forces, but the mounting atrocities began to sway popular support from the British.
British soldiers mistreated the Irish prisoners in plain view of the public, while escorting them out of Dublin. One such example was the order issued by British Captain Lee-Wilson who directed Tom Clarke's bandages be removed from covering an open gunshot wound. Additionally the Captain ordered Sean MacDermontt's (disabled by polio) walking stick be removed, and directed the prisoners to relieve themselves where they lay in the streets. 89 The greatest impression on the population was the summary execution of the alleged leaders of the Rising. , 1919-1921, 24-25. 89 Coogan, 1916: The Easter Rising, 171-173. 90 Williams, The Irish Struggle 1916 -1926 leaders by summary execution degraded the leadership of the Irish rebellion, but the popular support from the local population for the nationalist cause grew exponentially. One of the major lines of effort within irregular warfare is intelligence. Guerrillas and security forces alike identify key information about themselves, which the enemy considers 91 Gray, "The Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21": 379-380.
92 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 93 Williams, The Irish Struggle 1916 -1926 94 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 valuable to their effort. 95 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 96 Ibid., 88. War I provided the English with a highly trained and well-equipped force to conduct major combat operations. After the war, the army reduced the number of personnel in the active force providing a recruiting source for the additional security in Ireland.
The requirement for supplementary local security forces in Ireland in 1919 directed recruiting towards ex-military personnel. Two organizations emerged from the additional support to the RIC. One was the "auxiliaries" and the other the "Black and Tans." 97 The auxiliary forces deployed to Ireland in an area security role to augment local law enforcement agencies, but never trained formally in that capacity. 98 The only difference between the two was their uniforms. The more famous supplemental security element was the "Black and Tans" (black coats and tan trousers). Their fame is from the unauthorized and undisciplined reprisal attacks on suspected republican civilians and business. They created forward operating bases throughout Ireland, which they used to launch raids, conduct patrols, and initiated reprisal attacks. The "Black and
Tans" became notorious not for their ability to conduct small unit operations, but for their reprisal attacks which resulted in civilian deaths. 99 Although both the auxiliaries and RIC conducted reprisals as well, it was the Black and Tan uniform which served as a symbol to the community.
The Royal Irish Constabulary role in area security served as a classic example for lack of integration between military and law enforcement. Distrust between local officials and the Black and Tans lead to animosity and poor coordination to conduct security operations. Another contributing factor was the condition of the RIC. The majority of personnel were frozen into position at the onset of the First World War with little or no ability to advance or retire.
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97 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 Ibid., 89.
99 Williams, The Irish Struggle 1916 -1926 100 Ibid., [176] [177] [178] Reprisals conducted by the United Kingdom forces on civilians and unarmed members of would not have the same depth of knowledge of the environment thus giving the rebels the 104 Williams, The Irish Struggle 1916 -1926 McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919 Independence, -1921 106 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 107 Williams, The Irish Struggle 1916 -1926 advantage. 109 The constant pressure on law enforcement led to compromises by both parties. In , 1919-1921, 34-35. 112 Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916 -1921 McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919 Independence, -1921 Ibid., 49. illustrates the army's capability to integrate with other services to achieve a combined effect.
Integration describes the army's ability to operate not only with other military services, but also multinational and interagency. During the First World War, the British army contributed an expeditionary force to support the French against Germany and its allies. The army was effective as a multi-national partner in bringing about the end of the war in Europe. The same army struggled against the irregular enemy in Ireland partially due to integration challenges with local security forces. The army and supplemental security forces were heavy handed in their approach resulting in civilian casualties thus leading to tension between the population, local security forces, and the military. The multi-layered security forces failed to adapt to the changing environment allowing the insurgency to disintegrate over time, the security apparatus which was effective during the 1916 Easter Rising. Army also capable of employing the same tenets to achieve their desired strategic conditions in contrast to U.K. security forces in Ireland. The future of the United States Army requires a force that will defeat conventional, irregular, and transnational threats simultaneously while in support of civil authorities. ADP 3-0 reflects this requirement and is a valid document to prepare the force for current and future threats in an ever-changing international system.
